INTRODUCTION
Because famous trademarks are widely recognized by consumers, they are likely victims of several types of actionable harm, including confusion, dilution, tarnishment, and other injuries based on damage to brand equity. In recognition of the value of famous trademarks and the need for comprehensive federal protection, in 1946, Congress passed the Federal Trademark Act, known as the Lanham Act.' In its original form, the Lanham Act protected trademarks by prohibiting a broad array of conduct likely to cause confusion, deception, or mistake in the marketplace, but the act did not prohibit the "dilution" of a mark. 2 It thus excluded injuries caused by a blurring of the distinctiveness of a mark or tarnishment of the positive images associated with that mark.
The failure of federal law to fully protect the goodwill and the positive and exclusive associations developed by the trademark owner led twenty-seven states to enact dilution statutes. On January 16, 1996, the void in federal protection was filled when President Clinton signed into law the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995,' which creates section 43(c) of the Lanham Act. Section 43(c) represents federal recognition of the dilution doctrine and the corresponding need to protect the goodwill embodied in the distinctiveness and commercial magnetism of well-known marks. 4 Traditionally, the dilution doctrine targets two types of harm. First, the doctrine prevents use of a mark that causes the "blurring" or "whittling away"
of the distinctive quality of a mark. This facet of the doctrine protects the response that is associated exclusively with the goods or services of the trademark owner." 5 The second harm targeted by the dilution doctrine is tarnishment. "The sine qua non of tarnishment is a finding that plaintiff's mark will suffer negative associations through defendant's use." 6 Tarnishment cases often involve provocative or humorous uses of well-known marks, 7 but "tarnishment is not limited to seamy conduct." ' Decisions finding dilution but not a likelihood of confusion are often based on the tarnishment prong, 9 although several courts have found dilution from blurring in the absence of tarnishment or a likelihood of confusion. 1°T he new federal dilution statute has been hailed as a remedy for the "patchquilt system of protection"'" under the twenty-seven state dilution statutes. According to critics, the state statutes have been interpreted inconsistently and generally have not provided a common basis for nationwide injunctions.12
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. c (1995).
6. Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that tarnishment occurs when the junior use creates an undesirable, unwholesome, or unsavory mental association with the senior user's mark).
7. See, e.g., Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 501-02 (stating that use of "Spa'am" for name of porcine puppet character in children's movie not likely to dilute SPAM for lunch meat, despite defendant's intent to poke fun at the famous lunch meat); D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110, 116 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding that use of "Super Stud" and "Wonder Wench" by singing telegram business dilutes SUPERMAN and WONDER WOMAN marks); see also cases cited infra note 138.
8. Hormel Foods, 73 F.3d at 507. 9. See, e.g., Deere, 41 F.3d at 45 (holding that use of Plaintiff's animated, scared version of "Deere" logo by competitor does not cause confusion but "risks possibility that consumers will come to attribute unfavorable characteristics to a mark and ultimately associate the mark with inferior goods"); American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Labs., 10 U.S.P.Q. Absent extraterritorial enforcement, owners of well-known marks arguably had to choose a favorable jurisdiction to assert dilution rights. 13 Consistent with the legislative intent, section 43(c) appears to enhance significantly the arsenal available to owners of famous marks, but the language of the statute is subject to varying interpretations. The statute explicitly applies only to famous marks, 14 a limitation that does not exist in specific language of most state statutes. 15 Thus, although section 43(c) has been heralded for bringing uniformity and consistency to the law of dilution, an analysis of the language and history of section 43(c) reveals several potential pitfalls and subjects for interpretive dispute. It may not be a panacea for trademark owners.
This article examines section 43(c) in the context of the historical evolution of the dilution doctrine and the history of the statute and its meaning. Part II summarizes the historical development of the dilution doctrine in the United States, ultimately leading to the enactment of the federal dilution statute. Part III analyzes section 43(c), discussing a variety of theoretical issues and examining the potential practical effects of the statute. Historically, a trademark cause of action was based on tort doctrines of fraud or deceit, which prevented loss resulting from consumer deception, rather than trespass, which protected the property rights developed in a mark. 6 Thus, traditionally, there could be no trademark infringement by a non-competitor because deception did not divert sales through "passing off" one person's goods as those of another. 7 This rationale meant that, at early common law, a non-competitor could appropriate another's mark with impunity. 8 As improvements in travel and communication made it possible for marks to attain widespread fame, courts in various countries began to recognize that appropriation of a well-known mark could give a non-competitor an unfair and unearned advantage in the marketplace. In 1898, the Eastman Kodak Company successfully enjoined the use of the mark KODAK® on bicycles in the United Kingdom. 19 Similarly, in 1924, a German court found that the owner of the famous mark ODOL for mouthwash was entitled to cancel a registration for ODOL for steel products, stating that the complainant had "the utmost interest in seeing that its mark is not diluted," and that, "it would lose in selling power if [I]t has of recent years been recognized that a merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his own exploitation to justify interposition by a court. His mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the owner's reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own control. This is an injury, even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and another can use it only as a mask.
24
Commentators have also stressed the need for federal protection based on misappropriation of the brand equity developed in a mark. In his landmark 1927 article, The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection, 2 Frank I. Schechter introduced the dilution doctrine in the United States. Although never using the word "dilution" in this seminal work, Schechter concluded that protection of trade identity involves not only the question of deception of the public, but also protection against the vitiation of the "uniqueness and singularity" of that mark.
26 By way of example, he noted that if courts permitted KODAK bath tubs and cakes, the mark would "inevitably be lost [among] the commonplace of confusion concept has been expanded to "extend protection against use of [Plaintiffs] mark on any product or service which would reasonably be thought by the buying public to come from the same source or thought to be affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by the trademark owner." Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting 3 MCCARTHY, supra, note 15, § 24.03, at 24-13). Thus, as presently conceived, a likelihood of confusion might include situations in which the consumer believes use of a mark is part of a line extension, a licensed use, or a private label version of the well-known brand. See, e.g., Cadbury Beverages, Inc. v. Cott Corp., 73 F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists about whether COTT used by private label soft drink manufacturer is likely to be confused with COTT' used by branded soft drink manufacturer) ("Manufacturers of branded products often sell products under a private label.").
22 words of the language, despite the originality and ingenuity in their contrivance, and the vast expenditures in advertising." 27 In 1932, Schechter and others unsuccessfully proposed the enactment of a federal trademark act known as the Perkins Bill.' It contained dilution provisions protecting "coined or inventive or fanciful or arbitrary" registered marks against uses of the mark in a manner that might "injure the goodwill, reputation, business credit ... of the owner of the previously used mark., 29 Congress took no action on the bill.
In 1946, in legislative history to the Lanham Act, Congress recognized the need for national and uniform protection of trademarks greater than that provided under existing federal trademark laws:
[T]rade is no longer local, but is national. Marks used in interstate commerce are properly the subject of federal regulation. It would seem as if national legislation along national lines securing to the owners of trademarks in interstate commerce definite rights should be enacted and should be enacted now.
3
Despite congressional recognition of the need for additional protection, as well as scholarly and judicial sentiment recognizing the need for complete protection for dilution as well as confusion, deception, and false advertising, Congress failed to include a remedy for dilution in the Lanham Act. 31 Congressional inaction, however, did not reduce judicial frustration with attempts to appropriate the "commercial magnetism" of well-known marks. In the same decade that the need for the Lanham Act was debated, and before it was adopted, Justice Frankfurter echoed Learned Hand's concern for propertylike value inherent in a developed mark, eloquently and succinctly describing the threat targeted by dilution statutes:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of symbols.
[A] trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trademark owner has something of value. Other courts have since gone to great lengths to find a likelihood of confusion when dilution appeared to be the appropriate but unavailable remedy.
33
The trend toward adoption of state dilution statutes was a response to judicial and scholarly concerns regarding a need for an express remedy for dilution. Massachusetts adopted the first dilution statute in 1947," 4 and twentysix other states have followed suit. 35 Most state statutes are modeled after Section 12 of the Model State Trademark Bill, which was adopted in 1964 by the United States Trademark Association (the "USTA"). 36 The Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods ("TRIPS") and the Paris Convention). With respect to "well-known" marks, Article 16 of TRIPS permits member countries to prohibit the use of a mark on goods or services that are not similar to those for which the well-known mark is registered if use of the junior mark would suggest a connection with the well-known mark and the owner of the well-known mark is likely to be damaged by use of the junior mark. See TRIPS, Dec. 15, 1993, Part II, § 2, art. 16.
"unnatural" expansion of trademark rights would chill the development of trademark rights by others and shift the balance of protection of interests strongly in favor of the trademark holder at the expense of the consumer and uninvolved third parties.
2
In late 1995, an amended version of the proposed federal dilution act was reintroduced, and both houses of Congress quietly passed the bill, which President Clinton signed on January 16, 1996. The enacted version of section 43(c) largely parallels the 1987 Trademark Review Commission's proposed statute. Not included, however, are the registration requirement in the 1987 proposal and the Commission's proposal for a separate section addressing tarnishment, which the Senate deleted from the legislation that became the Trademark Law Revision Act. 53 
III THE SCOPE AND EFFECT OF SECTION 43(c)
Liability under the federal dilution statute is premised on terms generally similar to those in section 13 of the amended Model State Trademark Bill:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.
The term dilution means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of-(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. 4 As indicated by this language, a major distinction between the federal statute and most state dilution statutes is that a mark must be famous to qualify for protection. Thus, the legislative history states that "[t]he purpose of [Section 43(c)] is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion., 56 As with the state statutes, liability is triggered when a junior user uses a mark in a manner that causes a mental connection between the junior user's mark and the senior user's mark. As a result of the connection, "the ability of the senior user's mark to serve as a unique identifier of the [senior user's] goods or services is weakened because the relevant public now also associates that designation with a new and different source., Instead of evoking an immediate response from purchasers, the senior mark is left to compete with similar marks. Over time, as other uses crowd the market for mental associations, the senior mark becomes ordinary. This process is based largely on the "blurring" prong of the dilution doctrine. The legislative history suggests that relief also may be available for "tarnishment" if a famous mark, appearing in a distasteful setting, causes a distortion of the positive association connected to a brand. However, the definition of dilution in the federal statute does not specifically mention such a negative association and does not contain the "injury to business reputation" language of most state dilution statutes.
58
The federal statute should provide owners of famous marks a higher degree of stability and predictability for marketing and managing their marks. For example, under the federal statute, national injunctive relief is available when appropriate. The availability of this remedy was an important factor driving passage of the legislation because some courts have been reluctant to grant multi-state injunctive relief under state dilution statutes. 5 9 Section 43(c) also makes available the remedies set forth in sections 35(a) 6 and 3661 of the Lanham Act, which authorize monetary relief subject to the court's discretion and the principles of equity. Relief under these sections is available if the junior user "willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark., 62 Presently, dilution statutes in only three states provide for monetary recovery.
63
The new federal law also includes several limitations that are arguably applicable to, but not expressed in, state dilution statutes. For example, section 43(c) exempts the following from liability: fair use of a famous mark in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark; non-commercial use of a mark; and all forms of news reporting and news commentary. as with other parts of the federal statute, provides added security to federal registrants.
As this summary suggests, section 43(c) is intended to increase judicial acceptance of the dilution doctrine. 66 A detailed analysis of the federal statute, however, reveals a variety of issues open for interpretation and dispute. Many of these issues have been litigated under state dilution statutes. Because state cases provide significant precedent on these issues, they are likely to have ongoing value and relevance for courts interpreting and applying the federal statute. 67 Likewise, although the 1987 proposed federal dilution act was not enacted, the Trademark Review Commission's commentary and the legislative history of the 1987 proposed statute provide important insight for interpreting the new federal statute. 68
A. The Fame and Distinctiveness Requirements of Section 43(c)
Relief under section 43(c) is available only to owners of distinctive and famous marks. 69 Only the three state statutes that track section 13 of the 1992 version of the Model State Trademark Bill have statutory language with a similar fame requirement. 7° The absence of a fame requirement in the remainder of state statutes, however, has not prevented courts from analyzing whether a mark is sufficiently well-known and distinctive to qualify for 66. TRC Report, supra note 46, at 455 ("We envision the courts adopting a more enthusiastic view of our proposed statute than they have of the state dilution laws."); see also id. at 457 ("[The statute] makes the availability of dilution protection nationally uniform and predictable.").
The early returns on these predictions are mixed. Some courts have taken an expansive view of the statute to protect owners of famous marks. 1996) (finding that DON'T LEAVE HOME WITHOUT.. . family of marks for travel and financial services and related products was not diluted by DON'T LEAVE HOME WITHOUT ME POCKET ADDRESS BOOK for address book).
67. protection. 7 In light of the varying results reached by many of these courts, and because the federal statute expressly requires fame and distinctiveness, the drafters of section 43(c) attempted to provide guidance with a series of nonexclusive factors for determining whether a mark qualifies for protection:
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to-(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services within which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the mark's owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
72
Some of these factors deal primarily with fame (whether a mark is sufficiently well-known to warrant federal protection), and others focus primarily on distinctiveness (whether a mark is capable of being diluted). All of the factors represent an attempt to add stability and consistency to dilution case law by providing objective criteria for determining whether marks qualify for federal protection. 7 3 According to the Trademark Review Commission, the fame and distinctiveness requirements limit the scope of the statute to the marks that most need protection:
Famous marks are most likely to be harmed by reduced distinctiveness. They are enormously valuable but fragile assets, susceptible to irreversible injury from promiscuous use. Although they are occasionally protected on likelihood of confusion grounds, we are convinced they deserve dilution protection which is both effective and predictable. 74 The Commission further suggested that the federal statute should be "highly selective" and applied to a limited class of marks. 75 As a result, the federal statute appears to provide narrower protection than the state dilution statutes. 71 . Compare Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that LEXIS for information retrieval services not diluted by LEXUS for automobiles, and noting that "if a mark circulates only in a limited market, it is unlikely to be associated generally with the mark for a dissimilar product circulating elsewhere"), with Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("The statute should not be read to deprive marks from protection against dilution in limited areas of use, since otherwise it would afford protection only to the most notorious of all marks."); Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377, 381 (Or. 1983) ("We see no reason why marks of national renown should enjoy protection while local marks should not. A small local firm may expand efforts and money proportionately as great as those of a large firm in order to establish its mark's distinctive quality.").
72. 
The Difficulty of Evaluating "Fame" and "Distinctiveness."
Despite the recitation of these guiding factors, as well as the legislative intent that they be applied narrowly, the fame and distinctiveness factors are open-ended and involve many variables. Because fame and distinctiveness are threshold issues under the statute, and because both are amorphous concepts, litigants are likely to dispute vigorously whether plaintiff's mark satisfies these requirements.
For example, the fame requirement implies a quantitative inquiry (how famous the mark is), but the statute neither defines "famous" nor identifies the degree of notoriety sufficient to make a mark "famous."
76 In a limited class of cases involving undeniably famous marks such as COKE@, XEROX®, ROLLS ROYCE@, KODAK®, MICROSOFT®, etc., there will be little doubt about whether a mark is famous. In most situations, however, the fame inquiry will be fact-sensitive, and courts are likely to reach different results under similar facts. As with many issues in trademark litigation, whether a mark is famous will depend largely on the quantity and quality of evidence presented to the fact finder. A well-conducted survey and other evidence of "actual fame" 7 7 or, alternatively, evidence that a mark is not famous may be highly
Whether a mark is sufficiently distinctive to be capable of being diluted is a similarly open-ended question, and a mark's position on the "spectrum" of distinctiveness will not be dispositive. 79 Even well-known, inherently distinctive 76. Noting the imprecise nature of the term "famous," one commentator identifies eight synonymous and equally vague terms used in international treaties and trademark laws: "well-known; notorious; exceptionally well-known; highly renowned; highly reputed; marks with a (high) reputation; and marques de haut renommee." David H. Tatham, What is a Famous Brand? 14 (1995) (paper delivered in connection with speech at MARQUES 1995 Annual Conference). Tatham offers a definition for the term "famous" in the context of international fame:
A famous mark is a mark which is extremely widely known in the country concerned to at least 80% of the potential purchasers of the goods or services for which it is known, and to at least 90% of the relevant trade circles. Furthermore a famous mark must be a registered mark at least in its owner's home territory, and have a value, calculated by an internationally acceptable method, of at least $4000 [sic] million. Id. at 22 (emphasis original).
77. By "actual fame," the authors mean evidence showing in fact that plaintiff's mark is not only promoted, advertised, or otherwise held out to the relevant class of consumers, but also received and recalled by the relevant class of consumers. Thus, while evidence of significant advertising expenditure may provide indirect evidence of fame, testimony, surveys, or unsolicited media coverage showing the effectiveness of the advertisements would constitute evidence of "actual fame." See, e.g., Harlequin Enters., Ltd. v. Gulf & Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946, 950 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that unsolicited media coverage contributed to strong secondary meaning of "Harlequin Presents" book cover trade dress).
78. If a mark is promoted and advertised extensively, but defendant demonstrates that consumers have not retained an impression of the mark, the fame requirement may not be satisfied. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1028 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that surveys showed that LEXIS for computerized research service was famous among attorneys but virtually unknown among general public).
79. Trademark law uses a spectrum of distinctiveness. Marks generally are classified as coined, arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, and generic. Coined, arbitrary, and suggestive marks are considered "inherently distinctive," while descriptive and generic marks are not. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 13. It is possible for a descriptive mark to "acquire" distinctiveness and great strength marks may be incapable of being diluted if there is extensive third-party use. Under this theory, Domino's Pizza, Inc., successfully argued that its mark DOMINO'S for pizza delivery services did not dilute Amstar's arbitrary and famous mark DOMINO for sugar. 80 2. The Flexibility of the Individual Fame and Distinctiveness Factors. Because of the evidentiary sensitivity of the fame and distinctiveness determinations, litigants are likely to dispute the relevance of each of the individual factors enumerated in section 43(c). For example, under fame factor (A),"' the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness is relevant to whether a mark is famous. Although a famous mark with sufficient acquired distinctiveness qualifies for protection, 8 2 the statute provides no guidance for determining the degree of acquired distinctiveness necessary.
Facing a similar issue under state dilution statutes, courts historically have disagreed about the level of distinctiveness necessary for a dilution claim. Many courts apply the distinctiveness requirement narrowly, 3 while others grant relief to arguably weak marks. 84 Professor McCarthy notes the difficulty of making "value judgments about the 'strength' of a mark sufficient to be based on proof of a high degree of "secondary meaning." Secondary meaning refers to public recognition that the name does not simply refer to the nature of the user's products in a descriptive sense, but also serves to identify the source of origin of the goods or services. Factors (B) and (C) 88 address the duration and extent of use and advertising of the mark and, like factor (A), are susceptible to evidentiary disputes. 8 The exact parameters of how much is substantial should be left to a case-by-case analysis, depending on the type of goods or services and their channels of distribution. 95 We did not employ the terms "majority" or "substantial majority" because we believed they would impair flexibility. We also did not employ the term "appreciable number" from the many decisions holding that likelihood of confusion must be established with respect to an appreciable number of ordinary prudent purchasers. Under these decisions the threshold is quite low. We believe that a higher standard should be employed to gauge the fame of a trademark eligible for this extraordinary remedy.' Apparently, then, "substantial" may mean less than a majority, but the minimum quantum for demonstrating fame is higher than the "appreciable number" standard in the infringement context. Because of the ambiguity of the term "substantial," the types of disputes that have occurred in the past about the sufficiency of plaintiff's geographic use are likely to recur under the federal statute. 97 The potential problem of regional fame has not troubled two courts that have considered whether regionally-famous marks were diluted under the federal statute. In Wawa, Inc. v. Haaf, 98 the court found that plaintiff's mark WAWA for convenience stores was diluted under section 43(c) by defendant's mark HAHA, also used for convenience stores. WAWA operated 500 convenience stores in the states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and Connecticut. 99 Without considering whether fame in such a limited geographic area precluded application of section 43(c), the court determined that plaintiff satisfied the fame requirement because plaintiff had used the WAWA mark and advertised it extensively for almost ninety years." with weekly pewspapers sold in various Maryland suburbs,"° was diluted under sectioi 3(c) by THE FREDERICK GAZETTE, also for a community newspaper. d.-Thus, the most that one could say about plaintiff's family of marks is that they were famous in two Maryland counties. Paying lip service to the fame requirements," the court found dilution under the federal statute without any consideration of the fact that plaintiff's mark was arguably famous only in a portion of one state. A corollary issue to geographic fame, assuming a mark is famous only in a portion of the United States, is whether a national injunction is available. Dilution is actionable under section 43(c) only when a party uses a mark after the mark has become famous.°5 Because an injunction covering areas in which a mark is not famous would effectively be granting relief before the mark became famous in those areas, the language of the statute may not support an anticipatory national injunction in favor of a regionally famous mark.
On the other hand, the statute does not state expressly that national relief is unavailable to a regionally famous mark. If the fame requirement is interpreted as the only condition precedent to relief, a mark that is famous in any substantial portion of the United States may be entitled to all available relief, subject only to the principles of equity and the court's discretion." For example, it may be equitable to grant a national injunction if a defendant intentionally adopts a mark knowing it is famous in a substantial part of the United States, and scheduled to be rolled out in other areas, in order to trade upon the commercial magnetism of the mark. On the other hand, if the owner of a regionally famous mark cannot establish a likelihood of dilution in areas in which its mark is not famous, national injunctive relief would be inappropriate. 1°7 102. Examples include the Gaithersburg Gazette, Montgomery Gazette, Rockville Gazette, etc. Id at 690 n.1. Plaintiff also referred to itself or its publications using the GAZETTE mark. Id. at 690-91 (references include "Gazette Newspapers" and "Gazette").
103. Defendant's publication circulated mainly in Frederick County, Maryland. Id. at 691. Although plaintiffs newspapers circulated in an adjacent county, the court found that plaintiff's publications are circulated and known throughout Frederick County. Id.
104. The court cited the fame factors. See id. at 697 n.6. 105. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West Supp. 1996). 106. Id. Even before the enactment of the "constructive use" provisions of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, federal registration generally provided the registrant with anticipatory national priority against junior users of the mark, but only after the registrant expanded its use or reputation into the junior user's area. See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959) (denying injunctive relief because no likelihood of confusion when federal registrant's mark was not known in the junior user's trade area). By analogy, the owner of a famous mark might make a similar argument with regard to its right to expand. A mitigating factor against such a claim, however, is the fact that registration can be identified by a search, whereas fame and distinctiveness cannot readily be ascertained absent a system for compiling and tracking famous and distinctive marks.
107. In this regard, geographic rights principles from the infringement context may be instructive for determining whether a likelihood of dilution exists in areas remote from the senior user's zone of reputation. See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co., 267 F.2d at 364-65.
[Vol. 59: No. 2 TRADEMARK DILUTION Factors (E)l" s and (F)" involve the degree of recognition of plaintiff's mark in the respective channels of trade. These factors raise the following questions: Will fame within particular channels of trade or a particular market suffice? Will it be a limiting factor? The Mead Data Central case demonstrates that the answer to both questions might be "yes."
In Mead Data Central, the plaintiff established that its LEXIS mark was famous only within the limited market of attorneys and accountants.°B ecause defendant's LEXUS mark would be used in connection with an automobile offered and marketed to the general public, the court determined that plaintiff's mark lacked sufficient notoriety among the general public to generate the mental association necessary for dilution to occur. Surveys showed that only one percent of the public recognized plaintiff's LEXIS mark, and "such distinctiveness as LEXIS possesses is limited to the narrow market of attorneys and accountants. Moreover, the product which LEXIS represents is widely disparate from the product represented by LEXUS. For the general public, LEXIS has no distinctive quality that LEXUS will dilute.""'
The narrow scope of the plaintiff's channels of trade and the breadth of the defendant's were significant factors limiting the likelihood of dilution." 2 Had the plaintiff used the LEXIS mark in different channels of trade, or, perhaps if the evidence showed that the defendant's automobiles were marketed to a segment of the public disproportionately represented by those familiar with the LEXIS mark, the court might have reached a different conclusion." 3 Although the court found that the "recognized sophistication" of attorneys and accountants would prevent "any significant amount of blurring,"" 4 implicit in the decision is the possibility that the "consuming public" of attorneys and accountants could haie been large enough to create a likelihood of dilution."' Likewise, if the LEXUS mark was principally used in channels of trade 108 frequented by attorneys and accountants, there may have been a likelihood of dilution among a sufficient amount of the consuming public to warrant relief.
The same principle may apply in other discrete markets and channels of trade to demonstrate or refute a likelihood of dilution.
116
For example, children may be less sophisticated than attorneys and accountants and, therefore, more prone to diluting mental associations. As a result, dilution may be more likely for famous and distinctive marks used in connection with goods and services marketed primarily to children. 17 Similarly, the class of nonEnglish speaking consumers may itself be a relevant market under the statute. Foreign language marks, or other marks predominantly used in markets and channels of trade occupied by non-English-speaking customers, may be famous and distinctive in particular markets but not in others. 118 In these types of cases involving particular markets and channels of trade, as in Mead Data Central, the type of evidence will be as important as the amount of evidence if either party claims that market-specific factors increase or decrease the likelihood of dilution.
Again, principles of equity may limit the scope of injunctive relief available to a plaintiff that can establish dilution only in a particular market or channels of trade. 119 Comprehensive injunctive relief may be inappropriate in markets or channels of trade in which the plaintiff's mark is not famous and distinctive, or in which there is no likelihood of dilution.' 2°F actor ( 117. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1037-38 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (finding that because children ages seven through twelve occupy a "substantial part of the market for both the plaintiffs and defendant's goods," and a survey showed that children in this age group "associated the two marks to a greater extent than adults," CABBAGE PATCH KIDS for dolls was diluted by GARBAGE PAIL KIDS for trading cards).
118. For example, the mark GOYA for foods is probably famous among Hispanic Americans, but may not be famous among other consumers. Courts have found that a likelihood of confusion and dilution may be enhanced when Spanish-speaking customers are part of the relevant market. See Chassis Master Corp. v. Borrego, 225 U.S.P.Q. 1240, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (finding dilution and a likelihood of confusion) ("Spanish[-]speaking customers in Miami regularly refer to CHASSIS MASTER as 'Master Chassis.' Thus, by merely changing one letter of a word Borrego was able to capitalize on the Chassis Master name and reputation."); Arthur Matney Co. v. Halcyon Essences Ltd., 207 U.S.P.Q. 77, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding a likelihood of confusion and stating that SELENE is confusingly similar to SERENA "especially... to the Spanish-speaking customers to whom all parties agree this product was addressed").
119. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 25 cmt. e ("A mark that is highly distinctive only to a select class or group of purchasers may be protected from diluting uses directed at that particular class or group . .. Uses of the mark in broader markets, although they may produce an incidental diluting effect in the protected market, are not normally actionable.").
120. have been 'diluted' have been held to be already so 'diluted,' weak and commonplace that there is no distinctive quality left to dilute by others."'" Thus, the mark McDONALD'S, a surname with strong secondary meaning, has acquired and retained distinctiveness in the restaurant and hospitality industries," 2 but extensive third-party use of the surname (as opposed to nonsurname "Mc" marks) in fields that are far different than fast foods (for example, local family businesses ranging from dry cleaning to clothing sales) may have rendered the mark incapable of being diluted in unrelated fields. 24 Similarly, extensive third-party use may preclude a dilution claim asserted by a local family business against a regionally famous junior user." z Widespread prior third-party use increases the difficulty of establishing dilution under the distinctiveness prong. 26 Nevertheless, when it is clear that the junior user adopted a similar mark to trade on the commercial magnetism of the famous mark, relief for dilution is more likely.' 27 This factor raises yet another fact-sensitive inquiry that will turn on the quantity and quality of evidence, and a survey or some other evidence of "actual dilution" caused by third-party use may be valuable. For example, if the defendant argues that plaintiff's mark is widely used, plaintiff may respond with evidence showing that the relevant consuming public is not aware of the thirdparty users. Alternatively, the third-party use may exist in markets or regions in which neither party operates. If so, and if plaintiff's mark is sufficiently famous and distinctive within the markets and areas in which the parties do operate, relief under section 43(c) may be available.
B. The Intent Factor
The federal statute specifically provides enhanced remedies where a defendant willfully intends to trade on the owner's goodwill or to cause the dilution of the mark." 2 The federal statute is silent, however, about whether bad faith enhances the likelihood of dilution, or, conversely, the lack of bad faith reduces the likelihood of dilution.
It is relatively clear that the deliberate adoption of a mark to trade upon the reputation and goodwill of another should be a strong, if not determinative, factor favoring a finding of dilution.' 29 It is reasonable to presume that a defendant is likely to accomplish the purpose of its intent.
1 30 A more difficult question in the courts, particularly in the Second Circuit, is whether bad faith is a requirement for a dilution claim.
1 31 The better view, as noted in the Restatement, is that "the intent of the defendant should not be balanced against factors relating to the market context of the use in order to determine the likelihood of dilution."' 3 2 While it may be inferred that an actor is likely to bring about the intended result, the same is not true for the converse proposition. The absence of an intent to dilute has no bearing on whether use of a mark is likely to dilute.
C. First Amendment and Fair Use Issues
Section 43(c) by its specific terms does not apply to three types of conduct that raise substantial free speech and fair use issues: "Non-commercial use of a mark . . . analyzed trademark parodies under the First Amendment suggests that the exception for non-commercial uses in section 43(c) is unlikely to enhance a defendant's First Amendment rights in cases brought under the federal statute because most free-speech dilution cases already turn on whether the defendant's use is "commercial" or "non-commercial."' 3 9 The difficult issue in litigation has not been whether non-commercial speech is protected (as recited in the safe harbor of section 43(c)(4)(B)) but whether allegedly parodic use of a mark is commercial or non-commercial speech." 4 Because many First Amendment dilution cases involve hybrid uses of marks (uses that have indicia of commercial and non-commercial speech), the answer to this question is complex. Generally, resolution of the First Amendment issue depends on whether the primary purpose of the use was to communicate a message and whether use of the trademark bears any relationship to the message. 139. A possible exception would be the emergence of a "new" class of non-commercial uses that do not involve a defendant's First Amendment speech interests. The same defendant in two cases brought under the federal statute has unsuccessfully claimed that the use of a famous mark as an Internet domain name is non-commercial use that is not susceptible to attack under the federal statute. In both cases, the courts determined that the defendant's adoption of a famous mark as an Internet domain name, for the purpose of re-selling the domain name to the owner of the famous mark, constitutes a commercial use of the mark. See Intermatic Corp. v. Toeppen, No. 96 C 1982, 1996 WL 716892, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 1996) ("Toeppen's intention to arbitrage the "intermatic.com" domain name constitutes a commercial use."); Panavision, at *7 ("Permissible, non-trademark uses stand in sharp contrast to Toeppen's use of the Panavision marks. Toeppen traded on the value of the marks as marks by attempting to sell the domain names to Panavision."). The express exception for non-commercial uses might have made a material difference, however, had either court found that the defendant's use was non-commercial.
140. Commercial speech is speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983). The test for determining the constitutionality of commercial speech has four parts: (1) whether the speech pertains to lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) whether the government has a substantial interest in taking the action that restricts the speech; (3) whether the government's action directly advanced the underlying interest; and (4) whether the government action was no more extensive than necessary to fulfill the interest. Central Hudson Gas book were designed to "mimic the distinctive style of the family of works created by Theodor S. Geisel, better known as Dr. Seuss."'" In addition to copyright and trademark infringement claims, plaintiff alleged that defendants' use of seven trademarks was likely to dilute the distinctiveness of the marks under the federal dilution statute.' 45 Defendants claimed that its book was a non-commercial parody expressly exempt from a dilution claim under the federal statute." 4 According to the court, "Dr. Seuss replie [d] that [defendants'] use cannot be accepted as 'non-commercial' because the marks were used 'to make their book more entertaining and to consequently, sell more copies.""" Rejecting this argument, the court held that defendants' expressive use of the Dr. Seuss marks "is not rendered commercial by the impact of the use on sales."'" Accordingly, defendants' use of the Dr. Seuss marks was exempt from the reach of section 43(c).
Arguably, the court's analysis of the defendants' First Amendment defense to plaintiff's trademark infringement claim suggests that the express exception for non-commercial speech in section 43(c) does expand the parodist's rights beyond those that exist under state dilution statutes.' 49 Considering plaintiff's trademark infringement and unfair competition claims, the court found that the non-commercial nature of defendants' use was insufficient, absent a statutory exception, to prevent an injunction under the trademark infringement and unfair competition provisions of the Lanham Act."' 0
Because the First Amendment analysis led to different results under plaintiff's federal dilution claim and its infringement and unfair competition claims, the statutory exception in 43(c) may operate to expand the speech rights of a trademark parodist. Unlike infringement and unfair competition claims, however, dilution claims do not implicate the public policy against consumer confusion. For infringement claims involving trademark parody, the public interest in avoiding potential confusion must be balanced against the parodist's free speech interests. This factor does not arise under a dilution claim, which only involves the potential erosion of the trademark owner's rights in a mark. Thus, the distinction between the interests at stake in dilution and infringement claims, rather than the express exception for non-commercial speech contained 762 (1975) (stating that commercial speech is "speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction")); see also id. at 1572 ("Even if the use would also increase the sales of the commentary, the use remains noncommercial.").
149. See id at 1571-73. 150. Id. at 1573 ("Just as in copyright, trademark infringement will be excused only where necessary to the purpose of the use. Where alternative means of achieving the satiric or parodic ends exist that would not entail consumer confusion, the First Amendment will not protect the parodist from being held to infringe." (footnotes omitted)).
in the federal statute, may explain the different results reached by the Dr. Seuss court.
Generally, courts applying state dilution statutes that do not contain statutory exceptions for non-commercial speech have used the commercial/noncommercial distinction to determine whether the First Amendment precluded application of the statute to a parodic use of a mark. In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 15 ' the Eighth Circuit rejected a First Amendment defense after defendant published a fake advertisement for MICHELOB OILY beer on the back cover of a humor magazine. Several factors influenced the result: The advertisement parody was placed where real advertisements are routinely located, 5 ' and the advertisement included "only a tiny disclosure" that the advertisement was an editorial parody. 5 ' The advertisement also suggested that Anheuser-Busch's products were contaminated with oil,"' and the attack was not necessary to defendant's alleged free speech goals of commenting on the Gasconade oil spill and water pollution generally.' 55 Consequently, the court found that defendant's alleged parody was more an attempt to appropriate the commercial magnetism of the MICHELOB mark for commercial purposes than an attempt to convey a message.
In contrast, in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,156 the court overturned an injunction against the publisher of "High Society" magazine for its sexual parody of plaintiff's catalogs and held that the First Amendment prevented application of dilution statutes to the use of a mark in a noncommercial speech setting. 5 ' The parody consisted of a few pages inside a magazine. The court found that defendant's use of "L.L. Beams Sex Catalogue" was non-commercial largely because defendant did not seek to merchandise its products under the guise of trademark parody, and it was likely that consumers would understand the parodic message.' 5 8 In Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc.,' 59 the Second Circuit also focused on the commercial nature of a manufacturer's use of John Deere's drawn "deer logo" in a commercial for lawn tractors:
Sellers of commercial products who wish to attract attention to their commercials or products and thereby increase sales by poking fun at widely recognized marks of noncompeting products, risk diluting the selling power of the mark that is made fun of. When this occurs, not for worthy purposes of expression, but simply to sell products, that purpose can easily be achieved in other ways. As indicated by these cases, the commercial or non-commercial distinction is not amenable to a bright-line standard. "Hybrid" cases involving speech with commercial and non-commercial attributes make for difficult decisions. By way of example, a parody of machine guns and the National Rifle Association, if used by a public interest group on T-shirts to raise money in support of a campaign for stricter gun control laws, may straddle the line dividing commercial and non-commercial speech. The content of the parody is clearly expressive speech, and the commercial aspects of the sale of the T-shirts may give way to the non-commercial political speech or charitable use of the funds.' 61 In contrast, a parody might present a more difficult commercial speech issue if the parody is used by a for-profit enterprise whose only goal is to capitalize on the commercial magnetism of the National Rifle Association's mark. 62 Accordingly, because the First Amendment already protects non-commercial speech, the exception in section 43(c) probably will have little effect, nor will it refine or clarify the outcome of such litigation arising under the federal statute. challenge is brought against a news agency, the case would likely be subject to similar First Amendment limitations absent the express exception in the federal statute. The difficult issue is not whether news-related use of a mark is protected, but whether the use fulfills the purposes of news-gathering and dissemination or is merely a pretext for traditional commercial activity.
The statutory exception may expand existing law in marginal cases in which the news agency's use is only minimally related to news reporting. The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment does not require absolute immunity in favor of the media's news-gathering function. 166 Rather, the government may provide relief based on a news agency's complete appropriation and depletion of the "commercial stake" in a venture. 167 On the other hand, the government is also free to provide more protection for the press than is provided by the First Amendment." 6 Under this authority, it is arguable that the exception in the federal statute goes beyond the constitutional requirements of the First Amendment by protecting use of a mark that fulfills any aspect of the news-gathering function, regardless of its commercial purpose.
The Comparative Advertising Fair Use Exemption.
Similarly, the federal dilution statute's express exception for fair use in comparative advertising probably adds little to existing law. Courts have already determined that dilution statutes do not apply to fair use in comparative advertising 169 and in other related contexts. 17°O nce again, the difficult issue is not whether fair use is protected, as recited in section 43(c), but whether the challenged use of a mark constitutes "fair use." ) (fair use of allegedly generic term) (explaining that defendant's use of mark "L.A. GEAR" for "athleisure" wear and footwear does not dilute plaintiff's mark "GEAR" for apparel because "gear" is generic as applied to apparel, but that issues of fact remain as to whether "gear" is generic for handbags and soft luggage); see also New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992) (dilution not at issue) ("[I]t is often virtually impossible to refer to a particular product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point of reference or any other such purpose without using the mark.").
Factors in this determination may include, inter alia, whether the use is in good faith, 71 "the degree to which the mark is altered and the nature of the alteration,, 172 whether the mark is being used in a descriptive sense, 173 and whether plaintiff's mark is used to identify defendant's product or in a generic sense.1 74 The generic use problem arose in Sykes Laboratories., Inc. v. Kalvin,1 75 where the court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether defendant's label for a fingernail conditioner, which stated that defendant's product was a "version" of SYKES PERFECT NAIL, constituted a fair use comparison that identified the defendant's product or was a generic use of the SYKES PERFECT NAIL mark. 173. Ringling Bros., 855 F.2d at 484 ("If Celozzi-Ettelson had used the slogan The Greatest Used Car Showroom on Earth it might have had a plausible argument that its slogan was laudatory and descriptive; but it used the word Show, not Showroom, and, unlike the circus, the used car business is not literally a show.").
174. Sykes Lab., Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 859 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (involving comparative reference to competitor's nail conditioning product) ("The anti-dilution statute in no way restricts the right to advertise a claim that one's product is as good as a better known brand, but one may not do it in a way that risks turning the latter into a generic term.").
175. Id. 176. Perhaps, the defendant could have avoided the issue altogether by referencing the SYKES PERFECT NAIL product as follows: "Compare to SYKES PERFECT NAIL brand nail conditioner."
177. H.R. ReP. No. 104-374,supra note 11, at 2 ("HR 1295 is designed to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the marks, or tarnish or disparage it."). conclusion that Congress also intended the Act to cover dilution through tarnishment."' 79 According to the legislative history of the federal statute, however, the statutory definition of dilution "is designed to encompass all forms of dilution recognized by the courts, including dilution by blurring, by tarnishment, and disparagement."'"
The conclusion that blurring language encompasses tarnishment is consistent with the authors' view that tarnishment is merely an enhanced form of blurring. The mental association necessary for blurring occurs, but with tarnishment it occurs in a negative context that furthers the injury to the commercial magnetism of a mark. Likewise, courts considering tarnishment claims brought under the federal statute have uniformly assumed that section 43(c) covers a tarnishment claim. 8 ' Arguably, however, if the classic case of tarnishment does not lessen the capacity of a mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, the definition of "dilution" in the federal statute does not achieve the congressional intent to cover tarnishment. Several courts have held that rather than reducing the exclusive association between the mark and the owner's goods and services, tarnishing uses of a mark may actually increase public identification, and, therefore, do not violate the blurring prong.""
In defining "dilution," Congress appears to assume that both dilution and tarnishment are covered by the blurring language of the federal statute. Yet, it can be argued that this assumption is misplaced. Most state statutes protect specifically against "injury to business reputation,' 83 but the federal statute has no comparable language. If the tarnishment prong of dilution is based on the "injury to business reputation" language, relief for tarnishment is arguably not available under the federal statute. [d] to prevent the type of blurring which might result from a more subtle or insidious effort at humor at plaintiff's expense"); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 25 cmt. i ("In most instances such uses are intended to refer back to the original trademark owner and serve to confirm rather than undermine the associational significance of the mark.").
183. But see Connecticut, South Carolina, and Washington statutes, supra nnote 15, which, like the amended dilution section of the Model State Trademark Bill, define dilution in the same terms as the federal statute.
184. Professor McCarthy contends that traditional blurring language subsumes tarnishment and that the "injury to business reputation" language does not define a separate harm:
In the author's opinion, the phrase "injury to business reputation" does not stand alone as an alternative to "dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark," but the 186. Schechter, supra note 20, at 825, 830-31. But see supra text accompanying notes 28-29 (discussing Schechter's proposed Perkins bill, which was designed to prevent general injuries to the trademark owner's goodwill and reputation).
187. The Commission expressly excluded tarnishment from coverage of § 43(c) and, instead, drafted a separate section: "The Commission believes that trademark tarnishment and disparagement are a separate form of legal wrong, and recommends amending Section 43(a) to deal with them." ld. at 455 n.134; see also id. at 434 ("[A] separate legal basis for relief will remove the need to apply legal doctrines which do not fit. We propose adding a new Section 43(a)(3) specifically to cover disparagement and tarnishment."). However, the Commission suggested that blurring language encompasses tarnishment because tarnishment affects a mark's distinctiveness: "Although tarnishment can dilute trademark distinctiveness, the typical injury is less dilution than injury to reputation." TRC Report, supra note 46, at 434 (emphasis added). During congressional hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee amended the Commission's proposal of a separate tarnishment section by deleting "language making trademark tarnishment and disparagement a separate statutory cause of action." S. REP. No.
The Restatement also suggests that blurring and tarnishment may be legally distinct. Sections 25(1)(a) and 25(1)(b) of the Restatement 1 88 are separate provisions describing blurring and tarnishment as the types of harm that can lead to liability without proof of confusion. The commentary to section 25 also addresses each concept separately." 9 Although comment c to section 25 of the Restatement states that "tarnishment and dilution of distinctiveness. . . both undermine the selling power of a mark," the Comment refers to them separately and identifies them as "two distinct threats" that are "conceptually distinct.' 19 0
Thus, arguably, while blurring and tarnishment undermine the selling power of a mark, they may do so in different ways: blurring, by reducing distinctiveness, 191 and tarnishment, by interfering with the positive images associated with the mark, an injury that may occur independently of injury to the distinctiveness of a mark. 192 In light of several Supreme Court holdings that the "clear language" of the Lanham Act should be applied, 1 93 it would not be surprising to find counsel arguing that if the "injury to business reputation" language is the statutory basis for a tarnishment action under state law, the absense of such language from the federal statute precludes a claim for tarnishment under the Lanham Act. Such arguments may be unsuccessful, however, because, in some contexts, courts have ignored the plain language of the Lanham Act and defer to congressional intent. 194 Justice Scalia stated recently that "[i]t is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver."' 95 Under a strict constructionist view like Justice Scalia's, the omission in the federal. statute of the "injury to business reputation" language that is contained in most state dilution statutes may mean that a claim for tarnishment is not available under the federal statute.
Thus, there appears to be a viable argument that a claim for tarnishment is not available under the federal statute. To date, courts considering claims for tarnishment under section 43(c) have not been troubled by the possibility that the statutory definition of dilution may not cover tarnishment. 9 6 Of course, the authors are unaware of a case in which a litigant has raised the issue. In light of the uncertainty surrounding the argument, it remains to be seen whether future litigants will challenge this aspect of the federal statute.
E. The Federal Statute Applies to Registered and Unregistered Marks
A preliminary version of section 43(c) was amended in the House to remove the limitation of the coverage of the proposed statute to registered marks. A similar restriction was included in the 1987 proposal for a federal statute. The amendment of the federal statute was proposed in the belief that limiting the statute to registered marks would undercut the United States's foreign trade position that famous marks should be protected regardless of whether they are registered in the country where protection is being sought. 1 9 7
Use of a mark is a condition precedent to obtaining trademark rights in the United States, and the damage caused by dilution is based on diminution in distinctiveness and goodwill that has been developed through use. As a practical matter, the amendment makes sense because it provides protection to unregistered marks that become famous "overnight." Such marks may be the subject of registration applications that have not matured into registrations only because of delays in the Patent and Trademark Office. Generally, it takes at least a year to obtain a federal registration. Although it is sound policy to encourage federal registration as early as possible, there is no doctrinal reason why a registration should be necessary for federal dilution protection.' 98
E Federally Registered Marks are Immune From Liability Under State
Statutes Under section 43(c), ownership of a federal registration is a bar to an action brought against the registrant under state statutory or common law dilution theories. ' This exception is intended to encourage federal registration2 and to provide security to federal registrants that develop national brand management strategies: "The commission. . . recommend[s] a provision making a federal registration a complete defense to an action under a state dilution law.
This approach would accord registrants additional security in expansion situations while not unduly restricting the operation of state law." 1 The federal statute fulfills this goal by providing federal registrants with a defense to dilution claims against all other trademark owners except those whose marks qualify for protection under section 43(c) (that is, owners of marks that were famous at the time the registrant began using its mark).
The exception for federal registrants increases the significance of opposition and cancellation actions in the Patent and Trademark Office, and trademark owners are likely to become more vigilant in monitoring publications for opposition. Because of the federal registration exception, opposition actions may be initiated even in cases where the likelihood of confusion is a close call. Likewise, as a preemptive strike against immunity to state law claims based on a federal registration, trademark owners also may be more likely to bring state dilution challenges in court prior to the issuance of a registration.
Congress did not add "dilution" as a basis for opposing or cancelling a registration.' The Trademark Review Commission considered but ultimately rejected a provision that would have made dilution a basis for opposing and cancelling registrations:
We considered whether a registrant entitled to dilution relief by way of injunction would be able to prove the requisite damage under Sections 13 and 14 to sustain an opposition or cancellation proceeding. On the one hand, it would be illogical to provide for injunctive relief but not the ability to prevent or cancel a diluting registration. On the other, extending the Board's jurisdiction to an entirely new category of claims with attendant administrative problems, expense, and uncertainty, should not be undertaken lightly. On balance, we believe the courts should make the determination of "damage" here, based on all of the factors, as they have in the past. As with all state dilution statutes, section 43(c) purports to apply "regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or ... (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. ' , 2 ' Despite the apparent clarity of this language, some federal courts applying virtually identical language in the Illinois, Florida, and Oregon statutes have held that these state dilution statutes do not apply to competitors. 205 201. TRC Report, supra note 46, at 458; see also id. at 462 ("Trademark owners require the assurance that once they have obtained federal registration, they are generally free to market their goods or services throughout the United States, subject only to prior rights in a confusingly similar mark.").
202. Babson Bros. v. Surge Power Corp., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1953, 1955 (T.T.A.B. 1996) (denying motion to add claim for dilution under federal statute as basis for opposition to registration and finding that federal statute does not create a new ground for opposition). An opposition or cancellation action can be brought only on specific grounds enumerated in § § 2, 13, and 14 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 1052, 1063, and 1064 (1994). 2°8 Finally, in Soloflex, Inc v. Nordictrack, Inc., the Oregon federal court based its holding on its asserted inability to find a case on point. The clear language and legislative history of the federal statute, as well as the views of the Trademark Review Commission and leading commentators, should be sufficient to remove any doubt that the federal statute applies to competitors.
IV

CONCLUSION
The myriad of doctrinal and statutory issues discussed in this article may raise as many questions as they answer, leaving ample opportunity for dispute as to the meaning and effect of the federal statute. In addition to these issues, the adoption of the federal dilution statute will likely lead to developments in cutting edge issues facing owners of famous brands. One can expect able lawyers, armed with the federal statute, to argue that a variety of innovative theories warrant recognition of the classic admonition against reaping where one has not sown.
For example, one area of potential development under both federal and state dilution statutes involves the current trend of retailers, private label manufacturers, and suppliers to adopt a simulation of a famous trade dress in order to trade on the commercial magnetism of that trade dress. They often do so for several reasons. First, they may wish to create an association with the famous brand and to suggest that the goods or services offered in connection with the look-alike trade dress are provided by the owner of the famous trade dress. Second, they may wish to suggest that their products are comparable to the product or service offered by the owner of the famous brand. The imitators' approach often is to argue that the private label manufacturer has prominently used a distinctly different word mark or "house mark" in connection with the look-alike trade dress in order to identify its products or services, thereby avoiding a likelihood of confusion. 2 "
This approach leaves the commercial magnetism of the famous trade dress at risk unless its owner can establish likelihood of confusion by such arguments as the following: confusion still exists due to lack of care by consumers; 2 10 consumer belief that the look-alike is a line extension of the famous brand; 21 ' consumer belief that the private label product is manufactured by the owner of the famous trade dress; 212 or the use of the look-alike trade dress falsely suggests that the private label product is comparable in quality to the name brand.
Surprisingly, although dilution may be the strongest basis for relief to the owner of the famous trade dress, dilution theories have not been a significant 209 [T] he use of the numeral '2' as opposed to the numeral '1' rather than differentiate the product, in fact, increases the likelihood that consumers will believe that the defendant's product is simply a variation on the basic 'A.I.' sauce or a line extension which emanates from, or is authorized by or otherwise affiliated with the same source as the 'A.I.' product.").
212. See, e.g., Tone Bros, Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (vacating summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist with regard to whether defendant infringed plaintiffs spice container design) ("[T]he relevant consumer [may] not think that the company identified on the private label was the manufacturer of the spices and instead may attach significance as to the manufacturing source to the container itself."), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1356 (1995); Benjamin Moore & Co. v. Talon Paints Prods., 917 F. Supp. 331, 335-36 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding trade dress associated with manufacturer's AQUAGLO brand and private label brands infringed by look-alike). But see Conopco, Inc., 46 F.3d at 1563-64 (discrediting evidence of confusion based on consumers' "erroneous" assumption "that national brand manufacturers secretly market private label brands").
[Vol. 59: No. 2 TRADEMARK DILUTION factor in private label or other look-alike trade dress cases. There is no reason, however, why a famous trade dress should not be viewed as any other trademark entitled to protection from dilution. 213 If the courts embrace the federal dilution doctrine to the same degree as they have the unfair competition and infringement provisions of the Lanham Act, the federal and state dilution statutes should provide a valuable weapon to owners of famous trade dress who are seeking to prevent the depletion of brand equity by private label and other competitors.
As we begin the second half century under the Lanham Act, we can expect new, creative arguments and developments in these and other uncharted waters of trademark law.
